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EQUITY’S FEDERALISM
Kellen Funk*
The United States has had a dual court system since its founding. One might
expect such a pronouncement to refer to the division between state and federal courts,
but in the early republic the equally obvious referent would have been to the division
between courts of common law and the court of chancery—the distinction, that is,
between law and equity. This Essay sketches a history of how the distinction between
law and equity was gradually transformed into a doctrine of federalism by the Supreme
Court. Congress’s earliest legislation jealously guarded federal equity against fusion
with common law at either the state or federal levels. The antebellum Supreme Court
obligingly adopted a strongly anti-fusion stance and took pains to protect federal equity
from experimental state-level reforms. In the midst of Reconstruction, Congress
reconfigured the ways federal equity would intermix with state law and legal process.
But in the twentieth century, Supreme Court doctrine set aside the well-documented
legislative history of Reconstruction statutes in favor of a mythic retelling of the 1790s
that reduced equity to a principle of federalism. This judicially invented historical
narrative has led to a peculiar asymmetry in practice today, where it has become
surprisingly easy for federal courts to equitably restrain the other federal branches but
significantly difficult for them to redress even extreme violations of federal rights at the
state and local level.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 2058
I. EQUITY’S ESSENCES ........................................................... 2060
II. FUSION AND FEDERALISM IN THE
ANTEBELLUM REPUBLIC .................................................. 2064
A. Early Statutes and Anti-Fusion in Congress ................ 2065
B. State Codes and Anti-Fusion at the
Supreme Court ....................................................... 2068
III. THE RECONSTRUCTION OF CHANCERY’S REACH ............. 2073
© 2022 Kellen Funk. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I am grateful for comments from
José Argueta-Funes, Sam Bray, Peter Douglas, Aziz Huq, Craig Green, Benjamin Johnson,
Jane C. Manners, Gillian Metzger, Kerrel Murray, Fred Smith, and Mila Sohoni, and for
research assistance provided by Nicandro Iannacci and Damonta Morgan. Special thanks
to Judge Martha Mills and to the families of Ernst Liebman and Charles Pressman for access
to personal papers and interviews.

2057

2058

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:5

IV. RECONSTRUCTION REMEMBERED IN THE
ERA OF EQUITY’S PUBLIC LAW ........................................ 2077
A. Fusion in the Federal Rules ..................................... 2077
B. Public Law Equity.................................................. 2079
C. Reconstruction’s Revival ......................................... 2080
D. Federal Equity Follows State Law ................................ 2083
CONCLUSION...................................................................................... 2090
INTRODUCTION
“The United States has a dual court system” is today an obvious
statement, clearly referencing the separate and semi-independent
court systems of the states on the one hand and of the federal government on the other. “The United States have1 dual court systems” was
an equally obvious statement in the early republic, but with a different
referent: discussion of and complaints about dual courts and double
proceedings were in that era far more often referring to the distinction
between courts of common law and the court of chancery, or for short,
courts of law and of equity. To be sure, not all of the American
colonies tried to transplant England’s dual system of courts—Puritan
New England devised a legal system without a separate branch of
equity2—but in sophisticated commercial colonies like New York and
South Carolina, and for the nascent English-trained bar in the
Americas, the rigid institutional division and jurisprudential
distinction between law and equity inhered, as it was often said, “in the
nature of things.”3
Meanwhile at the national level, the Constitution defined judicial
power as extending to cases in “law and equity,” and the first Judiciary
Act treated law and equity as separate jurisdictions even as the same
federal judge would be called upon to administer them both.4 The
mimicry of English legality could run only up to a point, then, for
England had neither inferior nor local courts of equity.5 The double

1 “There was a time a few years ago when the United States was spoken of in the
plural number. . . . [b]ut the war changed all that.” WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 1887, at 4.
2 See Stanley N. Katz, The Politics of Law in Colonial America: Controversies over Chancery
Courts and Equity Law in the Eighteenth Century, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 257, 262–65
(Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971).
3 See Kellen Funk, The Union of Law and Equity: The United States, 1800–1938, in EQUITY
AND LAW: FUSION AND FISSION 46, 56–69 (John C.P. Goldberg, Henry E. Smith & P.G.
Turner eds., 2019); see also Katz, supra note 2, at 264.
4 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
5 See P. Tucker, The Early History of the Court of Chancery: A Comparative Study, 115 ENG.
HIST. REV. 791, 795–96 (2000); JOSEPH PARKES, A HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY
(London, Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown & Green 1828).
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duality of the United States, a dual court system within a dual sovereignty, has thus been a defining feature of American legal history.
This Essay offers a sketch of that history. Of course, the history of
equitable practices at the state and federal level is a vast terrain, much
of it remaining to be explored, particularly at the level of lower courts.
Relying on archival research, this Essay focuses on the history of
equity’s federalism as it has been regulated by congressional statutes
and as its story has been retold by the Supreme Court in pivotal
interpretations of those statutes.
Congress’s earliest legislation jealously guarded federal equity
against fusion with common law at either the state or federal levels.
The antebellum Supreme Court adopted a strongly anti-fusion stance
and took pains to protect federal equity from experimental state-level
reforms. In the midst of Reconstruction, however, Congress reconfigured the ways federal equity would intermix with state law and legal
process. Providing for expansive removal rights and original causes of
action, the Reconstruction Congress empowered federal courts to
seize control of former state law actions without particular regard for
maintaining the distinction between law and equity.
After equitable remedies were extended against public officials
and law and equity procedure were merged in the 1938 Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the federal courts wrangled over competing
historical visions of how federal equity was to operate against state
actors and especially state courts. In a series of pivotal cases from 1960
to 1975, Supreme Court doctrine set aside the well-documented
legislative history of Reconstruction statutes in favor of a mythic
retelling of the 1790s that reduced equity to a principle of federalism,
one defined by an overdrawn regard for the sovereignty and
prerogative of the states.
In short, my account of federal equity is a story of anti-fusionist
structures and attitudes being exchanged for anti-federalist ones. In
arguing this, I do not mean to imply that some pure essence of equity
has been lost or distorted. In many ways the essential precepts of
equity—such as the maxim that equity follows the law—have remained
consistent over time, though they may struggle to bear the federalismprotecting weight the modern Court expects them to. What I think
has gotten lost and distorted is the intent of the Reconstruction
Congress that federal practice should be otherwise. As my brief foray
into the archives of the Justices’ chambers reveals, the Court has had
to actively ignore the Reconstruction statutes and their animating
intent in order to construct its modern fable of an anti-federalist
equity.
This judicially invented historical narrative has led to a peculiar
asymmetry in practice today, where it has become surprisingly easy for
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federal courts to equitably restrain the other federal branches but
significantly difficult for them to redress even extreme violations of
federal rights at the state and local level. This asymmetry is explored
briefly in the concluding section. The Parts that follow proceed
chronologically.
I.

EQUITY’S ESSENCES

A great deal of scholarship on equity and federalism has treated
equity as something familiar, federalism as the puzzle to be solved.6
More recent commentary, however, has shown just how variable equity
practice could be over time.7 This Part offers a brief overview of what
made equity special along the horizontal dimension—that is, as
compared to law. We will then be better equipped to assess equity
along the vertical dimension of state and federal interaction.
The essential features of equity often seem to be in the eye of the
beholder. During the same decade that practical treatise writers
emphasized equity’s malleable formlessness, Joseph Story published
his landmark account of equity as following rule-bound formality.8
Likewise, today’s jurists are divided on whether equity’s supplemental
character means it should fill the gaps left by the law,9 or should leave
such gaps as it finds them.10
Without space to fully describe equity’s history, we might best
follow the advice of law-and-litterateur Gary Watt by giving up the hunt
for “essential” features of equity and instead treat equity as several
“clusters” of ideas and languages that involve remedies, doctrines, and
maxims.11 As to the first two, equity exercised jurisdiction over

6 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV.
1141 (1988) and the literature discussed therein.
7 See Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. 920,
924 (2020); Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, and JudgeMade Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249, 255–56 (2010); Amalia D. Kessler, Our
Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the
Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1184–87 (2005).
8 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1835); 2 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1836). On the formlessness of equity and the problem it
posed for treatise writers, see 1 OLIVER L. BARBOUR, A TREATISE ON THE PRACTICE OF THE
COURT OF CHANCERY, at iv–vi (Albany, Wm. & A. Gould & Co. 1843).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Texas, No. 21-CV-796, at 38–41 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2021)
(order granting preliminary injunction).
10 See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 522 (2021).
11 GARY WATT, EQUITY STIRRING: THE STORY OF JUSTICE BEYOND LAW 89–90 (2009).
Watt also includes property among his clusters, a subject beyond the scope of this Essay but
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contested points of intent or will, matters of mind or soul that could
not be penetrated by lay jurors such as trusts, fraud, accident, or
mistake.12 Under the sure hand of churchly and royal officials, equity
developed a tolerance for balancing competing claims of merit rather
than handing victory to one side or another in an adjudication. It
could thus tackle complicated questions of guardianship, partition,
and account.13 By acting on persons rather than properties, equity
offered extraordinary remedies like injunctions and contempts backed
by the threat of imprisonment. All these features together gave equity
the “inquisitorial” powers to peer into the minds of its subjects through
the bill of discovery and interrogatory conferences.
As to equity’s famous maxims, two are particularly important for
the history of equity’s federalism. The first was at the heart of Story’s
Commentaries: equity follows the law.14 Writing against a seventeenthcentury moral tradition that supposed equity supplied discretion to
mitigate the harshness of common-law rules,15 Story pronounced that
equity could make up for a legal deficiency only “where the principles
of law, by which the ordinary courts are guided, give a right, but the
powers of those courts are not sufficient to afford a complete
remedy.”16 In cases where “there exists no rule, applicable to all the
circumstances,” the chancellor had to decide “whether the party
should be remediless, or whether the rule furnishing the closest
analogy ought to be followed.”17 In Story’s view, equity did not offer
causes of action independent of common-law rights. Equity could act
only on entitlements established at law. In the absence of those
entitlements, parties might well be left without a remedy by the
equitable judge.
Equity followed the law in a more mundane sense as well. As a
matter of practice, suits in equity were often filed only after litigation
had begun in the courts of common law, either because the legal
entitlement first had to be established at law or because the legal
explored in Henry E. Smith, Property, Equity, and the Rule of Law, in PRIVATE LAW AND THE
RULE OF LAW 224 (Lisa M. Austin & Dennis Klimchuk eds., 2014).
12 See Henry E. Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, 130 YALE L.J. 1050 (2021).
13 See generally GEO. TUCKER BISPHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY: A TREATISE ON THE
SYSTEM OF JUSTICE ADMINISTERED IN COURTS OF CHANCERY (6th ed. 1902) (discussing the
historical churchly and royal foundations of equity and the equitable treatment of, inter
alia, guardianship, partition, and account).
14 1 STORY, supra note 8, at 1.
15 See RICHARD FRANCIS, MAXIMS OF EQUITY (London, E. and R. Nutt, and R. Gosling
1728); 1 HENRY BALLOW, A TREATISE OF EQUITY (Dublin, Messrs. Byrne, J. Moore, W. Jones,
S. Lynch, and H. Watts 1793); 2 HENRY BALLOW, A TREATISE OF EQUITY (Dublin, Messrs. P.
Byrne, J. Moore, W. Jones, S. Lynch, and H. Watts 1795).
16 1 STORY, supra note 8, at 30–31.
17 Id. at 8–9, 30–31.
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remedy had to be shown insufficient or inaccessible.18 This feature of
double filing in separate courts to resolve what seemed to be a single
claim would be a crucial problem for the early history of equity’s
federalism.
The second maxim, equity acts on conscience, was most often used to
explain what equity was not, rather than what it was.19 Equity was not a
license, the treatises emphasized, for judges to rule according to their
own notions of private morality or of natural law. It did not confer
discretion to set aside legal rules or statutes—even harsh ones—where
they otherwise clearly applied. Story lamented that “many persons are
misled into the false notion” that equity’s “real and peculiar duty” was
to provide discretion in “correcting, mitigating, or interpreting the
law.”20
If equity was not discretion to depart from legal rules, what did it
mean that equity was a jurisdiction of conscience? We can make some
headway by paying attention to discussion of equity’s forms of
proceeding in the nineteenth century.21 Often those discussions had
the peculiar quality of describing equity’s form while arguing for
equity’s essential formlessness. As one leading New York lawyer put it,
“There was literally no form about it. The party stated his case, and
asked the relief he desired, and the court, if he proved his case, gave
him that relief.”22 What this lawyer meant was that equity did not use
forms of action the way the common-law courts did. Instead of
tethering specific pleas to particular remedies, a typical equitable bill
opened with the general assertion that “your orator is remediless . . .
by the strict rules of the common law,” and prayed for a decree “as
shall be agreeable to equity and good conscience.”23 That is, the

18
19

See BISPHAM, supra note 13, at 527–38.
See 1 CHARLES FISK BEACH, JR., MODERN EQUITY: COMMENTARIES ON MODERN
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS DETERMINED BY THE COURTS AND STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND
THE UNITED STATES (New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1892); H. ARTHUR SMITH, A
PRACTICAL EXPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (London, Stevens & Sons 1882);
THOMAS BRANCHE, PRINCIPIA LEGIS ET AEQUITATIS: BEING AN ALPHABETICAL COLLECTIONS
OF MAXIMS, PRINCIPLES OR RULE DEFINITIONS, AND MEMORABLE SAYINGS, IN LAW AND
EQUITY (London, W. Clarke & Sons 3d ed. 1818).
20 1 STORY, supra note 8, at 10. See also 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *432–
34, *440–42.
21 Mike MacNair argues that conscience traditionally meant only “private knowledge
of facts,” but this meaning was significantly obscured by the nineteenth-century practice.
Mike MacNair, Equity and Conscience, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 659, 659 (2007).
22 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 562 (William G. Bishop & William H.
Attree eds., Albany, Office of the Evening Atlas 1846) (Remarks of Charles O’Conor).
23 3 OLIVER L. BARBOUR, A TREATISE ON THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY
WITH AN APPENDIX OF PRECEDENTS 355–57 (Albany, Banks and Brothers, 2d ed. 1875).

2022]

EQUITY’S FEDERALISM

2063

typical cause of action24 was a failure of legal process, and the court
enjoyed latitude to choose among types and degrees of remedial
interference in ways the common-law forms of action typically locked
down.25
From the perspective of a court, this difference in forms of
proceeding was an essential feature of the division between law and
equity. As one New York jurist vividly put it, the difference between
common law and chancery, legal and equitable adjudication, was the
difference between the chain and the rope.26 Common law actions had
to be formed of indispensable links of material elements that had to
be pleaded and proven to support the claim. A trover pleading had to
allege the casual loss of an item found and converted to a defendant’s
use; the trial had to prove perfect title in the plaintiff and converted
possession and use by the defendant.27 A link was either established or
it was not, and the loss of any link destroyed the whole claim. Equitable
actions, on the other hand, included many strands of factual
allegations braided from narrative pleadings and fulsome interrogatories. Break a strand, perhaps even many strands, and the whole might
yet hold together as an entitlement to relief. A claim of fraud did not
have indispensable elements; it rather told a story with enough factual
detail (proven in court) to move the individual conscience of the
judge.28
The essence of equitable conscience consisted of this triumph of
facts over form. Common-law juries found facts but could usually
render only binary verdicts on remedies that had been constrained
from the start by the pleadings. Chancellors not only found facts but
also weighed them, tailoring remedies to whatever factual strands held

24 Such as there was. On the equitable cause of action, see Professor Bray and
Professor Miller’s essay in this Symposium, Samuel L. Bray & Paul B. Miller, Getting Into
Equity, 97 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1763 (2022).
25 For instance, a common law writ of trover could recover the market price of
converted chattels, while replevin sought to the return of the chattel property itself. Each
entailed different pleading requirements that would pose different questions to the jury for
resolution. Remedial theories could not be changed halfway through a case, nor could a
plaintiff merely establish an injury without simultaneously invoking the proper writ and
remedy.
26 Wooden v. Waffle, 6 How. Pr. 145, 152 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851).
27 “[T]he conversion is the gist of the action, the remainder being a mere fiction,”
one popular treatise explained of trover pleading. DAVID GRAHAM, JR., A TREATISE ON THE
PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 172 (New York, Gould,
Banks & Co. 1832).
28 See, e.g., WILLIAM WILLIAMSON KERR & ORLANDO F. BUMP, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF FRAUD AND MISTAKE 41–53 (New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1886).
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together across the elaborate and lengthy written records of
chancery.29
No surprise, then, that jurists sharply differed over whether it was
even possible to “fuse” or merge the systems of law and equity. For
some, the chain and the rope were inherently incompatible. The
images pointed to entirely different modes of adjudication, each of
which made sense only in light of its opposite.30 Others were more
sanguine about the chances for fusion, particularly if fusion meant a
greater role for equitable procedures and remedies to protect
common-law rights.31 Story’s Commentaries hedged on the question.
“The union of Equity and Law in the same Court,” he concluded,
“must be a mixed question of public policy and private convenience;
and never can be susceptible of any universal solution.”32 Nothing
inherent in the nature of jurisprudence demanded the eternal
separation of law and equity, but Story worried that fusion might have
unintended consequences. Remedies were tricky things, and remedies
to a remedial system trickier still. “The new remedy, to be applied,
may otherwise be as mischievous, as the wrong to be redressed,” Story
warned.33 For most of the nineteenth century, the federal courts were
far more inclined to heed Story’s warning than to strike off toward
fusion.
II.

FUSION AND FEDERALISM IN THE ANTEBELLUM REPUBLIC

Among the challenges of erecting a national government in a
single legislative session, the First Congress had to decide what to do
with a judicial power defined in terms of “law and equity”34 against a
backdrop of multifarious state practices, some of which had totally
repudiated an equitable jurisdiction. English precedent was little help.
The British had to manage the law-equity distinction only horizontally,
across the Courts of Westminster.35 The American federation of state
29 On the distinctive culture of early chancery’s written record practices, see AMALIA
D. KESSLER, INVENTING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
ADVERSARIAL LEGAL CULTURE, 1800–1877, at 27–34 (2017).
30 See Funk, supra note 3, at 53–56.
31 See id. at 56–60.
32 1 STORY, supra note 8, at 35–36.
33 Id. at 61.
34 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
35 Such at least was the theory. Although Thomas Macaulay remarked that British
India administered “a kind of rude and capricious equity,” English imperialists did not
regard the management of colonial law and equity as a domestic problem of federalism.
Elizabeth Kolsky, Codification and the Rule of Colonial Difference: Criminal Procedure in British
India, 23 L. & HIST. REV. 631, 639 (2005) (quoting 19 HANSARD’S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES:
FORMING A CONTINUATION OF “THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE
EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803” 532 (London, T.C. Hansard 1833)).
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and national judiciaries thus raised complicated questions about how
bifurcated courts were to relate across divided levels of government.
Much of Congress’s early legislation concerned this double
duality, often in explicit terms of state law and federal equity.
Twentieth-century jurists supposed that this legislation “reflected the
then strong feeling against the unwarranted intrusion of federal courts
upon state sovereignty,”36 but such readings give undue weight to the
federalist (vertical) dimension and ignore Congress’s aim to guard
against the fusion of law and equity (horizontally). This Part surveys
some of this major legislation and argues that federalism was a
comparatively minor concern of antebellum legislators and jurists who
were otherwise preoccupied with the fusion, or as it happened, the
non-fusion, of law and equity.
A. Early Statutes and Anti-Fusion in Congress
Chief among the early attempts to manage the law-equity
distinction alongside the state-federal division was the Anti-Injunction
Act of 1793. The name is somewhat of a misnomer. While the AntiInjunction Act today is a freestanding statute,37 it originated as half a
sentence in a broader set of strictures on federal jurisdiction.38 The
Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he precise origins of the legislation
are shrouded in obscurity,”39 but recent work by Professor James
Pfander and Nassim Nazemi has helped lift the shroud.40 They have
shown that while the text of the Act refers to federal courts interfering
with state process, Congress’s chief aim was to restrain federal equity
from interfering with legal process. As vividly illustrated by the
landmark litigation against “financier of the American Revolution”
Robert Morris, equitable procedure could essentially allow for the
horizontal re-litigation of a claim even as the same parties pursued
vertical re-litigation in the courts of appeals.41 The aim of the Anti-

36 Toucey v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 131 (1941).
37 Codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2018).
38 See Judiciary Act of 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 334–35 (“but no writ of ne exeat
shall be granted unless a suit in equity be commenced . . . ; nor shall a writ of injunction be
granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state; nor shall such writ be granted in any
case without reasonable previous notice to the adverse party”).
39 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 232 (1972).
40 See James E. Pfander & Nassim Nazemi, The Anti-Injunction Act and the Problem of
Federal-State Jurisdictional Overlap, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2013); James E. Pfander & Nassim
Nazemi, Morris v. Allen and the Lost History of the Anti-Injunction Act of 1793, 108 NW. U. L.
REV. 187 (2014) [hereinafter Pfander & Nazemi, Morris v. Allen].
41 Pfander & Nazemi, Morris v. Allen, supra note 40, at 195.
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Injunction Act, Pfander and Nazemi conclude, was to avoid these kinds
of “bifurcated proceedings.”42
A 1790 report of Attorney General Edmund Randolph sustains
this conclusion. Proposing language similar to the adopted statute,43
Randolph commented that “[i]t is enough to split the same suit into
one at law, and another in equity, without adding a further separation,
by throwing the common law side of the question into the state courts,
and the equity side into the federal courts.”44
These remarks seem to contemplate a variety of dual filings in law
and equity beyond the re-litigation problem identified by Pfander and
Nazemi. For instance, law reformers at the time frequently complained about the dual filings required for discovery procedure and
for creditors’ remedies. Because parties were disqualified from testifying at common law, litigants frequently had to file in chancery for a bill
of discovery to force admissions and disclosures that could then be
entered into evidence before the law courts.45 And while common law
could establish the right of a creditor to collect on a debt, states like
New York empowered only the court of chancery to issue coercive
process against defendants who fraudulently concealed assets.46 To
take just one notable example, by the time the Erie Canal was
completed, numerous merchants complained that collection suits
required at least two litigations: one to establish the right at common
law and one to effectuate the collection in equity.47 Randolph’s report
recognized that “[t]he common law is confessedly incompetent” on
matters of proof-taking and execution, but his proposed solution was
not to protect state process, but rather to enact a federal code of

42 Id. at 194.
43 But see id. at 221–26 for an in-depth discussion of the difference between
Randolph’s Report and the text of the Anti-Injunction Act.
44 EDMUND RANDOLPH, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL TO THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 29 (1790).
45 See KESSLER, supra note 29, at 26; GEORGE VAN SANTVOORD, A TREATISE ON THE
PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS UNDER THE NEW YORK CODE OF PROCEDURE 36–
37 (Albany, W.C. Little & Co. 2d ed. 1855) (describing discovery process before the code
reforms).
46 On creditor bill procedure, see 2 ALEXANDER M. BURRILL, A TREATISE ON THE
PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 290–303 (New York, John S.
Voorhies 2d ed. 1846). For practitioner complaints about double-filing, see THEODORE
SEDGWICK, JR., A STATEMENT OF FACTS IN RELATION TO THE DELAYS AND ARREARS OF
BUSINESS IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 30–35 (New York, Alex.
S. Gould 1838). GULIAN C. VERPLANCK, SPEECH WHEN IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE IN THE
SENATE OF NEW-YORK, ON THE SEVERAL BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS FOR THE AMENDMENT OF
THE LAW AND THE REFORM OF THE JUDICIARY SYSTEM 3–7 (Albany, Hoffman & White 1839).
47 VERPLANCK, supra note 46, at 21–22.
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procedure that would supplant the insufficient processes of the
states.48
Indeed, Randolph’s report said nothing about the sanctity of state
court process. Instead, he made clear that his recommendations were
meant to restrict litigants to their own choice of forum: “For if the
plaintiff and defendant rely upon the state courts . . . they ought to
continue there as they have begun.”49 Rather than protecting states
from federal interference, Randolph’s logic ran in the other direction:
federal courts were not equitable adjuncts of the state tribunals,
supplying a bill of discovery or enforcement procedure for litigation
otherwise conducted wholly inside state tribunals. This reasoning
applied with special force for litigation in states that had not
established courts of equity. If New England states had not provided
for chancery courts, why should their litigants be able to dragoon a
federal chancellor into litigations they had chosen to commence in
equity-less jurisdictions?50
This same logic of insulating federal equity from the diverse state
experiments with judicial structure animated other signal acts
constituting the early federal courts. What we now call the Rules of
Decision Act—Section 34 of the first Judiciary Act—commanded
federal trial courts to apply the laws of the states in which they sat in
common-law cases, but not in equity.51 The Process Acts of 1789 and
1792 likewise ordered federal courts to use state procedures only in
common-law cases.52 By contrast, the same statutes provided (tautologically) that procedures in equity would consist of “rules[] and usages
which belong to courts of equity . . . as contradistinguished from the
courts of common law” and without regard to state practices or
constraints.53 Section 16 of the first Judiciary Act codified the maxim
that equity follows the law by declaring “suits in equity shall not be
sustained . . . in any case where [a] plain, adequate and complete
remedy may be had at law.”54 Early commentary confirmed that the
48 RANDOLPH, supra note 44, at 31–32.
49 Id. at 29.
50 Randolph’s suggested bill made sure to preserve federal equitable process in states
that had not established courts of equity. See id. at 17.
51 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(2018)).
52 Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93–94; Process Act of 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1
Stat. 275, 276. The latter Act permitted the lower courts to issue rules of practice in
common-law proceedings if they wished to depart from the default rule of state procedure.
53 Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 94 n.(a). Even after Congress in 1828
commanded the courts to adhere more strictly to state enforcement and execution
procedures, it preserved an independent federal equity in states that did not maintain
equitable courts and actions. See Process Act of 1828, ch. 68, § 3, 4 Stat. 278, 281.
54 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82.
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decree had no reference to federalism—“adequate . . . at law” always
meant federal, not local law.55
In short, Congress’s early legislation sought to ensure that the
rope of federal equity did not become entangled with the chain of
common law. That common law might arise as a source of restriction
at either the federal or the state level was almost purely incidental to
Congress’s program to protect against fusion. As a note in the first
volume of the Statutes at Large explained,
The equity jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is
independent of the local law of any State, and is the same in nature
and extent as the equity jurisdiction of England from which it is
derived. Therefore it is no objection to this jurisdiction, that there
is a remedy under the local law.56

Federal equity was released or cabined only by federal law. States
simply had nothing to do with it.
B. State Codes and Anti-Fusion at the Supreme Court
As states ventured further into the fusion of law and equity at
midcentury, the Supreme Court took up Congress’s mantle to protect
federal equity from fusionist reforms. Since 1792, both the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts possessed rulemaking power over legal
and equitable procedure.57 The High Court’s power was largely
dormant until the twentieth century.58 But as Randolph’s call for a
federal code of procedure continued to go unanswered, many lower
federal courts tried their hand at codification, especially as state after
state adopted New York’s Field Code of Procedure.
Named after its trial lawyer draftsman David Dudley Field, the
Field Code59 declared the distinction between law and equity entirely
abolished. One of its most important provisions operationalizing this

55 See id. § 16; n.(b).
56 Id. at n.(b).
57 See Process Act of 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276.
58 The Supreme Court never issued rules for common-law proceedings. A brief set of
ad hoc “rules of practice” for equity was promulgated in 1822 and re-issued with slight
amendments in 1842. Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 20
U.S. (7 Wheat.) v (1822); Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 42
U.S. (1 How.) xxxix (1843). But neither of these pamphlets resembled the systematic and
code-like Federal Rules of Equity that issued in 1912 and became a model for the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938. Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1048 (1982); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 909–1002
(1987).
59 ARPHAXED LOOMIS, DAVID GRAHAM & DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, FIRST REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS (Albany, Charles van Benthuysen 1848).
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decree was Section 231,60 now imitated by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(c): a judgment “should grant the relief to which each
party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in its
pleadings.”61 “There is no magic in forms,” the Code’s commentary
declared.62 No longer would common-law “jingles” like trover and
assumpsit unlock particular remedies.63 Instead, all pleaders would, as
they had done in equity, relate narratives of facts to conclusions of law,
and together courts and pleaders would select from an open menu of
remedies to provide the appropriate relief.64
The fusion of law and equity in the Field Code consequently
transformed both categories. Common-law procedure lost the rigidity,
but also the stability, of its formulary system.65 Equity’s insistence that
it could not intervene until the common-law process was shown to be
insufficient was annihilated—in a world without law and equity, equity
could hardly follow law.66 Field was perhaps too good a practitioner,
or too poor a theorist, to appreciate the transformations that his Code
set in motion. Key terms like remedy, entitlement, facts, and law were
left undefined. To fill the gaps, the Code relied on the situation sense

60 Id. at 194, § 231.
61 FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c). The 1937 Advisory Committee’s note explained that 54(c) “is
a usual code provision. It makes clear that a judgment should give the relief to which a
party is entitled, regardless of whether it is legal or equitable or both.” REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, 135 (1937). Cf. LAWS OF THE STATE
OF NEW-YORK, PASSED AT THE SEVENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE 540, § 231
(Albany, Charles Van Benthuysen 1848). I explore several dimensions of the Field Code’s
attempt at fusion in Kellen Funk, Equity Without Chancery: The Fusion of Law and Equity in the
Field Code of Civil Procedure, New York 1846–76, 36 J. LEGAL HIST. 152 (2015).
62 LOOMIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 141.
63 Id. at 145.
64 In this and in other regards my account differs from Professor Subrin’s assessment
that equity “conquered” common law only in the Federal Rules, while the Field Code
“leaned as much, or more, toward the view of common law procedure as to equity.” Steven
N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural
Vision, 6 L. & HIST. REV. 311, 338 (1988); see also Subrin, supra note 58. Field’s cocommissioner thought their system “approaches and assimilates more nearly with the equity
forms.” ARPHAXED LOOMIS, HISTORIC SKETCH OF THE NEW YORK SYSTEM OF LAW REFORM
IN PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS 25 (Little Falls, J.R. & G.G. Stebbins 1879). And Field declared
the triumph of equity to be “implied in the blending of the procedure.” David Dudley
Field, Law and Equity, 18 ALB. L.J. 509, 511 (1878). Altogether, it is worth taking seriously
the commission’s claim that “the basis” for the code “was substantially that upon which
courts of equity were originally founded.” ARPHAXED LOOMIS, DAVID GRAHAM & DAVID
DUDLEY FIELD, SECOND REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS 7
(Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1849).
65 For a humorous illustration of the value of forms, see Samuel L. Bray, The Parable
of the Forms, 93 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 623 (2019).
66 See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 19–20 (1991).
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of lawyers and judges, a sense developed in the pre-Code days of law
and equity, to apply “appropriate” remedies to cognizable harms.67
Until the Field Code, federal courts had managed to operate in
states that had never established equity courts but still recognized a
distinct body of common law. But the Field Code was different. It did
not take away equity and leave common-law systems in place, but rather
the opposite. Since Congress in the Process Acts had commanded
federal courts to use state procedure in law but not in equity, 68 federal
courts in fusionist states now had to identify law and equity in state
rules that no longer maintained a distinction.
Several federal courts escaped the dilemma by using their
rulemaking power to overwrite the Field Code and reject fusionist
reforms. The Eastern District of Wisconsin ignored the state’s Field
Code and advised litigants to “consider the practice of the Courts of
King’s Bench, and of Chancery, in England, as affording outlines for
the practice of this court.”69 The federal courts of Michigan also opted
for English procedure as it existed “prior to 1840” (even though the
rule itself was written in 1871).70
Other district courts attempted to accommodate the codes
despite Congress’s proscriptions against fusion. The District of Iowa
enumerated in one long rule all of the state’s code sections it would
accept in federal practice.71 The Northern District of Ohio promulgated fifty-seven rules retaining formulary actions for replevin and
ejectment while otherwise following the Field Code’s prescription to
require factual narrative pleadings.72

67 See, for instance, LAW REFORM TRACTS NO. 5: A SHORT MANUAL OF PLEADING
UNDER THE CODE 13–14 (Albany, W.C. Little & Co. 1856), in which Field had to relent and
leave the division between material facts and mere evidence unarticulated, supplied instead
by the lawyer’s craft sense: “What is and what is not essential, an uninstructed person might
not readily discover; but a lawyer ought not to be in doubt.”
68 See supra notes 52–53.
69 RULES OF PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE
CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
WISCONSIN 4 (Milwaukee, Starr’s Book & Job Printing House 1871).
70 RULES OF THE CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, FOR THE
DISTRICTS OF MICHIGAN, IN CASES AT LAW, IN EQUITY, ADMIRALTY, AND BANKRUPTCY 6
(Detroit, Richmonds & Backus, Law Book Publishers & Stationers 1871).
71 See RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF IOWA, SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IOWA, AND THE GENERAL ORDERS IN
BANKRUPTCY, OF THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IOWA 1 (Des Moines, Mills &
Company Publishers, Law Booksellers, & Stationers 1871).
72 RULES OF PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, INCLUDING
THE RULES IN EQUITY AND ADMIRALTY; ALSO, THE RULES ADOPTED BY THE CIRCUIT AND
DISTRICT COURTS OF THE U.S. FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO; AND THE ACT OF
CONGRESS DIVIDING THE DISTRICT OF OHIO 5–18 (Cleveland, Sanford & Hayward 1859).
For a full overview of the procedure rules of the various federal district courts on the eve of
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The Supreme Court rebuffed these accommodations on
numerous occasions, but the logic of its opinions ran in the same
direction as Randolph’s report had: federal equity had to be insulated
from state process, not the other way around. Otherwise, as the Taney
Court noted in two leading cases out of Texas, state procedure might
invite equitable scrutiny where it did not belong—most especially in
the domestic law of slavery.
Randon v. Toby involved a routine debt collection on a promissory
note issued to purchase enslaved persons.73 “But, unfortunately,” the
Court opinion read, “the District Court has adopted the system of
pleading and code of practice of the State courts; and the record
before us exhibits . . . a wrangle in writing extending over more than
twenty pages.”74 The real problem for the Court was not the number
of pages but their content. A routine common-law complaint would
have consisted of a single page with largely formulaic pleas (many of
them fictitious). But Texas’s equity-like procedures called for pleading
the facts of the case, telling the story of an illegal importation of
Africans. This story was irrelevant to the Court, because “[t]he buying
and selling of negroes, in a State where slavery is tolerated, and where
color is primâ facie evidence that such is the status of the person, cannot
be said to be an illegal contract, and void on that account.”75 The chain
of bona fide purchase agreements was not to be entangled with the
narrative rope relating the inequities of the property’s origination.76
In the same Term, Chief Justice Taney excoriated the Texas
district court for permitting a jury to assess the value of enslaved
persons rather than holding a bench trial in an equitable action for
account.77 The lapse, Taney believed, perfectly illustrated the limits of
federal conformity with state practice: state codes could not “govern
the proceedings in the courts of the United States . . . as authorizing

the Conformity Act of 1872, see generally 2 BENJAMIN VAUGHN ABBOTT, A TREATISE UPON
THE UNITED STATES COURTS, AND THEIR PRACTICE: EXPLAINING THE ENACTMENTS BY
WHICH THEY ARE CONTROLLED; THEIR ORGANIZATION AND POWERS; THEIR PECULIAR
JURISDICTION; AND THE MODES OF PLEADING AND PROCEDURE IN THEM (New York, Diossy
& Company 1871).
73 52 (11 How.) U.S. 493, 502 (1851).
74 Id. at 517.
75 Id. at 520.
76 See id. The Court’s condemnation of “code” procedure in Texas was somewhat
imprecise. Despite its civilian heritage, Texas did not enter the Union with a procedure
code, and it was the only jurisdiction west of the Mississippi River to reject the Field Code.
See Kellen Funk & Lincoln A. Mullen, The Spine of American Law: Digital Text Analysis and
U.S. Legal Practice, 123 AM. HIST. REV. 132, 134, 161 (2018). Nevertheless, Texas’s simple
narrative pleadings essentially tracked with the Field Code prescription. See William V.
Dorsaneo, III, The History of Texas Civil Procedure, 65 BAYLOR L. REV. 713, 717–21 (2013).
77 See Bennett v. Butterworth, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 669, 676–77 (1851).
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legal and equitable claims to be blended together in one suit.”78 To
say the Taney Court was suspicious of federal action on the domestic
law of slavery would be an understatement, but its fusion-resistant
jurisprudence showed that its concerns could often be addressed in
the same fashion Congress had provided for in its earliest statutes:
federal equity simply had to be walled off from state practice.
To be sure, the Justices groused about the fusion of law and equity
in cases that did not involve slavery. Justice Robert Cooper Grier, the
author of Randon, frequently decried the rash substitution of
traditional practice with “the suggestions of sciolists, who invent new
codes and systems of pleading to order.”79 In an 1858 opinion, Grier
wrote for the Court that fusion “is found to be beyond the power of
legislative omnipotence. They cannot compel the human mind not to
distinguish between things that differ. The distinction between the
different forms of actions for different wrongs, requiring different
remedies, lies in the nature of things.”80
It can be difficult for us who live on the other side of federal fusion
to appreciate the threat that Grier and his contemporaries perceived
in the prospect of a merged system of law and equity. The rigidity of
common-law pleading was not suddenly discovered in 1850. Jurists
long before then had recognized that short, general, often fictitious
pleas suppressed the backstory of a complaint and left the ambiguous
complications of any given case shorn from the record. That was the
point. Common-law pleading was valued not for what was said in the
pleas but for all that could be left unsaid. Where the rules of generality
worked injustice in a particular case—where, for instance, actionable
fraud was left out of the backstory—equity stood by to render
assistance. But for jurists like Grier, equity’s role was not to turn
routine litigation on a promissory note into a wide-ranging debate on
the justice of chattel slavery.
Anti-fusion was a consistent stance in the antebellum federal
courts, from Congress’s enabling legislation in the 1790s to the
Supreme Court’s decisional law of the 1850s. Where federalism arose
as an explicit concern, it was often subordinated to this anti-fusionist
stance. Federal equity had to follow federal law, not to protect state
process from federal disruption, but to protect federal equity from the
corrosive practices of the states.

78 Id. at 674.
79 McFaul v. Ramsey, 61 (20 How.) U.S. 523, 525 (1858). See also Green v. Custard, 64
(23 How.) U.S. 484, 485–86 (1860) (Grier, J.); Farni v. Tesson, 66 (1 Black) U.S. 309, 315
(1862) (Grier, J.).
80 McFaul, 61 U.S. at 525. Grier’s complaint was shared by many common-law lawyers.
See Funk, supra note 61, at 183–86.
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THE RECONSTRUCTION OF CHANCERY’S REACH

It is a well-known story that the Reconstruction Amendments
reversed the Taney Court on the legal personhood and citizenship of
slaves and freedmen. What is far less well understood is how
extensively the Reconstruction Congress also overthrew the Taney
Court jurisprudence on fusion and federalism. Two statutes were
foundational to this effort: the removal provision of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, and the opening section of the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act,
our modern 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Part takes up these two well-known
statutes and seeks to relate their significance to the history of fusion
and equity’s federalism.
Still on the books today, the civil rights removal law was the most
sweeping conferral of federal question jurisdiction on the lower courts
until 1875.81 Enacted before the Fourteenth Amendment, the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 defined national citizenship and committed the
government to protecting an enumerated list of civil rights.82 Section
3 of the Act empowered both civil and criminal defendants in state
tribunals to remove cases against them to a federal court if these rights
were “denied or cannot [be] enforce[d] in the courts or judicial
tribunals of the State or locality where they may be.”83 Congress
recognized that removal might shift a great deal of unfamiliar proceedings into the federal courts, including misdemeanor prosecutions, or
actions sounding in probate or guardianship. Contrary to the old
Rules of Decision Act and Process Acts, the removal provision
instructed federal courts to apply federal law where they could, but
whenever federal law ran out, “the common law, as modified and
changed by the constitution and statutes of the State . . . shall be
extended to and govern [federal] courts in the trial and disposition of
[a] cause.”84

81 The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, (codified inter alia at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1443 (2018)). Until Congress enacted our current 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in 1875, the lower
federal courts exercised only a very limited federal question jurisdiction, extending mostly
to cases removed by federal customs officers and, after 1866, civil rights defendants. See
generally Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal Question Removal, 71 IOWA L. REV.
717 (1986).
82 The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified inter alia at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1443 (2018)) (“[T]o make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property”).
83 Id. at § 3.
84 Id. Whereas Swift v. Tyson (41 (16 Pet.) U.S. 1 (1842)) had read “laws of the several
states” in the Rules of Decision Act to mean only state statutes, leaving room for the
development of an expansive federal common law, Id. at 18–19, the Reconstruction
Congress required courts to apply the “common law” of the states except where the “laws
of the United States,” likely meaning only statutory law, clearly governed. The Civil Rights
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Civil rights removal made two things clear. First, the Reconstruction Congress valued federal courts for their personnel more than for
their practices. The removal act was one of several during the period
in which Congress left state substantive law and procedure largely
intact but substituted federal judges or commissioners to make the
decisions at every step from mesne process to final judgment and
appeal.85 Second, federal lawmakers had devised removal in a way that
substituted the conventional back-and-forth dialogue of law and equity
with a much more categorical ouster of one jurisdiction (the state’s)
in favor of another (the federal), all necessarily enforced by a federal
equitable decree. To effect this, the Civil Rights Act incorporated by
reference an earlier officer removal provision that required a state
court to “proceed no further in the cause or prosecution” removed.86
Although the Anti-Injunction Act was never referenced, jurists
understood that Congress had superseded its anti-injunction statute
with the new removal statute.87 In the 1790s, federal injunctions were
restricted to insulate federal equity from state procedure and to force
litigants to proceed in state courts if they had opted to begin there.
After the Civil Rights Act of 1866, federal injunctions kept the legal
and equitable aspects of a case together while forcing the whole
litigation into a federal court at the option of defendants with civil
rights claims.
Section 1983 further extended these two aims. Finding persistent
“outrages” that included voter intimidation, midnight raids,
whippings, and even murders of freedmen and white southern allies,
Congress created an original cause of action for “the deprivation of
any rights” secured by the Constitution.88 A plaintiff injured by “any
Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27, 27. The reversal prefigured the regime that would take
hold after Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
85 See, e.g., An Act Relating to Habeas Corpus, and Regulating Judicial Proceedings in
Certain Cases, ch. 80, 12 Stat. 755 (1863); An Act to Continue in Force and to Amend “An
Act to Establish a Bureau for the Relief of Freedmen and Refugees,” and for Other
Purposes, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173 (1866); An Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government
of the Rebel States, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867); An Act to Further the Administration of
Justice, ch. 255, 17 Stat. 196 (1872).
86 The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27 (permitting removal “in the
manner prescribed” in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755).
87 See, e.g., COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REVISION OF TITLE
28, UNITED STATES CODE, H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at A181 (1947) (construing injunctions
against proceeding in removed cases as a power necessarily “in aid of” a federal court’s
jurisdiction); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 234 n.12 (1972) (construing the Civil Rights
Act to create an explicit exception to the Anti-Injunction Act).
88 An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, and for Other Purposes, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2018)). For the background history of southern violence and Congress’s
response in the Enforcement Acts, see Robert J. Kaczorowski, Federal Enforcement of Civil
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person” acting “under color of any [State] law” could bring an “action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”89
Jurisdiction was conferred upon the lower federal courts, and once
again Congress incorporated state practice and procedure to fill in the
gaps as it had in the civil rights removal provision.90
Jurists have long debated whether Congress really intended
§ 1983 to disrupt or displace judicial proceedings at the state level.91
But most of this debate has been carried on without reference to the
legislative drafts that preceded the 1871 Act. Professor Achtenberg’s
meticulous research has shown that § 1983 originated in a bill
proposed by Senator Frederick Frelinghuysen a couple weeks before
the House took up its own version of the Ku Klux Klan Act.92
Frelinghuysen’s bill created an original cause of action at law or in
equity just as the House bill did, but Frelinghuysen further specified
that federal courts had “power to issue injunctions and other proper
process for enforcing such jurisdiction.”93 Such a formulation appears
to be unprecedented in federal legislation up to this time but was
probably crafted to mirror the Anti-Injunction Act’s prohibition on
issuing the “writ of injunction” against state courts.94
The express reference to enjoining state proceedings was
removed from the final draft, but the substantive power was not. As
the House sponsor Samuel Shellabarger made clear in his speech
opening the debate, his changes to Frelinghuysen’s text were a matter

Rights During the First Reconstruction, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 155 (1995); MARK WAHLGREN
SUMMERS, THE ORDEAL OF THE REUNION: A NEW HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 255–77
(2014).
89 An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, and for Other Purposes, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2018)).
90 Id. (“[S]ubject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies
provided in like cases in such courts, under the provisions of the act of the ninth of April,
eighteen hundred and sixty-six.”).
91 See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, The Klan, the Congress, and the Court: Congressional
Enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments & the State Action Syllogism, A Brief
Historical Overview, 11 J. CONST. L. 1381 (2009); George Rutherglen, Custom and Usage as
Action Under Color of State law: An Essay on the Forgotten Terms of Section 1983, 89 VA. L. REV.
925 (2003); Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to
Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1989); Eric H. Zagrans, “Under Color of” What Law: A
Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. REV. 499 (1985). See also, e.g., Whole
Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994);
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
92 See David Achtenberg, A “Milder Measure of Villainy”: The Unknown History of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 1, 56 (1999).
93 S. 243, 42d Cong. (1871), available in Achtenberg, supra note 92, at 61–63.
94 See Judiciary Act of 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 334–35 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(2018)).
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of style.95 Fearful of losing moderate Republican support over
questions of constitutionality, Shellabarger repeatedly emphasized to
the House how closely he had made the text of § 1983 track with the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, an unquestionably constitutional statute that,
indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment had been ratified to uphold.96
The removal provision of the Civil Rights Act had secured federal
jurisdiction to suspend state proceedings by incorporating prior
legislation.97 Shellabarger followed suit by incorporating the procedural and remedial provisions of the Civil Rights Act, including the
removal section.98 The whole formed an elegant symmetry: whereas
defendants could escape biased state courts and enjoin their further
proceedings through civil rights removal, now plaintiffs could avoid
state courts and enjoin parallel proceedings through § 1983.
While President Grant deployed the other provisions of the Ku
Klux Klan Act successfully to eradicate the Klan in the Carolinas,99 the
success of civil rights removal and original causes of action under
§ 1983 was far more uneven. Thousands of cases quickly overwhelmed
federal dockets—the District of Kentucky saw its caseload triple in the
early 1870s—and extreme delays became common.100 Soon enough
the Supreme Court lent its hand to the forces of reaction. Landmark
cases imposed an overly rigid state action doctrine that was blind to the
95 Achtenberg writes that Shellabarger’s stylistic changes are “of interest only to
students of bad writing.” Achtenberg, supra note 92, at 51. But this humorous observation
misses what Shellabarger was after. The point was not baroqueness for its own sake, but to
mimic the baroque yet indisputably constitutional formulations of the Civil Rights Act. The
other radical supporters of the Ku Klux Klan Act did not find the change material. See, e.g.,
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 501 (1871) (statement of Sen. Frelinghuysen) (urging
the passing of a bill reflecting the policies of his S. 243 but using the language of the current
draft of H.R. 320 (§ 1983)); see id. at 776–77 (arguing against an amendment that altered
what his committee had endorsed when considering early drafts of S. 243 and H.R. 320).
The ultra-radical Benjamin F. Butler, whose own version of § 1983 would have had an army
of federal commissioners supervising and restraining state court proceedings in every
southern locality, believed the draft as amended accomplished all his proposal had set out
to do. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 441–52 (1871) (statement of Rep. Butler).
Many of Butler’s opponents agreed with him. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 351,
353 (1871) (statement of Rep. Beck); id. at 365 (statement of Rep. Arthur); id. at 398
(statement of Rep. Roosevelt); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1871) (statement of
Rep. Duke). For the details of Butler’s prescription, see Achtenberg, supra note 92, at 7–
11, 64–74.
96 See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1871) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger).
97 See supra note 84.
98 See An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, and for Other Purposes, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
99 See Kaczorowski, supra note 88, at 179–80.
100 See ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE
FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866–1876, at 42 (2d ed.
2005).
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ways state officials condoned putatively private violence.101 Civil rights
removal was nearly obliterated when the Court held in 1880 that racial
discrimination had to appear on the face of state legislation before
removal could be authorized.102 Civil plaintiffs increasingly learned
their lesson and filed their claims on the diversity docket as the surer
path to federal jurisdiction.103 But key to the story of equity’s federalism, the Civil Rights Act and § 1983 at least remained on the books,
where they could be rediscovered in a later era.
IV.

RECONSTRUCTION REMEMBERED IN THE ERA OF
EQUITY’S PUBLIC LAW

The twentieth century opened with a full reversal of the antifusion stance formerly adopted by federal jurists. At the same time,
equity’s reach was made to extend further beyond the traditional
private law boundaries known to the old courts of chancery. By
midcentury, the availability of public law injunctions on the menu of
federal court remedies made federal equity quite potent indeed. At
first, the Supreme Court eagerly recalled the lessons—and the
history—of Reconstruction as it deployed remedies against state
violations of constitutional rights. But over time, the Court gave up on
Reconstruction’s history and tried instead to put a novel twist on the
maxim that equity follows the law. From a principle of anti-fusion before
the War, the maxim was reborn as a timeless principle of federalism.
This Part surveys these developments in turn.
A. Fusion in the Federal Rules
“Equity conquered common law” in the 1938 Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Professor Subrin has written.104 The Federal Rules
brought an end to the statutory distinction between law and equity by
declaring there to be “one form of action—the civil action.”105 Old
legislation forbidding “suits in equity . . . in any case where [a] plain,

101 See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S.
214 (1875). See also HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW:
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835–1875, at 488–97 (1982).
102 See Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 319–20 (1879); see also Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas
Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 843–50 (1965).
103 See Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies,
107 YALE L.J. 77, 80 (1997).
104 Subrin, supra note 58, at 909.
105 FED. R. CIV. P. 2. The Rules of Decision Act followed suit by making state law the
“rules of decision in civil actions” when federal courts exercised diversity jurisdiction. 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (2018).
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adequate and complete remedy may be had at law” was cast aside.106
Rule 54 made clear that “a judgment should give the relief to which a
party is entitled, regardless of whether it is legal or equitable or
both.”107 The fusion of law and equity, as Subrin notes, generally
entailed the diffusion of equitable procedures and remedies to all
cases coming before the federal bar. Judges gained enhanced powers
to order discovery, aggregate claims, and terminate cases with
vanishing reliance on (or impediments from) juries.108
The codification of federal procedure was fairly rapid, but the
turn toward fusion was not. David Dudley Field called for federal
fusion as president of the American Bar Association in 1888.109 William
Howard Taft pressed for fusion after joining the Supreme Court in
1922.110 Professor Burbank has documented how legislation stalled
many times as Populists battled Progressives for control over the
courts.111
While a full account of the dramatic change from the staunchly
anti-fusionist stance of the antebellum federal courts has yet to be
written, the mere changing of the generations no doubt played some
role. The main draftsman of the Federal Rules, Charles E. Clark, took
up the academic study of code procedure as a young law professor and
was quite struck by the “cold, not to say inhuman, treatment which the
infant Code received from the New York judges.”112 If Field’s experiments had not proven a success, Clark believed, it was only because
they had never really been tried. Free from New York’s backwardlooking jurists, the federal courts under Clark’s code were to show the
nation how fusion could be done.113

106 An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73,
82 (1789) (repealed 1948).
107 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note
61, at 135; FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c).
108 Subrin, supra note 58, at 934; John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in
the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 555–56, 567–72 (2012).
109 See AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION 69–70 (Philadelphia, Dando Printing. & Publishing Co. 1888).
110 Burbank, supra note 58, at 1048, 1070–71.
111 See id. at 1069–94.
112 McArthur v. Moffett, 128 N.W. 445, 446 (Wis. 1910). The quotation was a favorite
of Clark’s. See Charles E. Clark, A Striking Feature of the Proposed New Rules—Change in Bar’s
Attitude Towards Improved Procedure—What Particularly Interested the Lawyers, 22 A.B.A. J. 787,
787 (1936); Charles E. Clark, The Union of Law and Equity, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1925)
[hereinafter Clark, The Union of Law and Equity].
113 See Clark, The Union of Law and Equity, supra note 112.
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B. Public Law Equity
While federal jurists traveled the slow road to fusion, equity
practice in America was bursting its traditional bounds. English equity
performed only private law functions. The Court of Chancery was
occupied with claims between private parties involving trusts and a
routinized interference in private contract and property cases at
common law.114 Public law functions were mostly taken up by the
Courts of Common Law through the prerogative writs like mandamus
and certiorari that could supervise and at times restrain the illegal acts
of the crown’s servants.115 Criminal equity was snuffed out by the
Puritan abolition of Star Chamber; after the seventeenth century, it was
practically a maxim of chancery that equity did not interfere in
criminal matters.116
These conventions of English equity were seriously challenged by
American practice in the twentieth century, at both the state and the
federal levels.117 Economic recessions in the Gilded Age meant that
bankrupt railroad corporations were entering equitable receiverships
at the same time that striking workers were destroying property under
the new management of courts and public officers.118 Injunctions and
counter-injunctions hopelessly confused the lines between public and
private equitable decrees,119 when the Court ruled definitively in Ex
parte Young that federal equity could restrain the unconstitutional acts

114 See generally, e.g., 1 GEORGE SPENCE, THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
CHANCERY (Philadelphia, Lea & Blanchard 1846); 2 GEORGE SPENCE, THE EQUITABLE
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY (London, V. & R. Stevens & G.S. Norton 1850).
115 On the common-law prerogative writs and their gradual merger with American
equity, see James E. Pfander & Jacob P. Wentzel, The Common Law Origins of Ex parte Young,
72 STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1304, 1336 (2020); Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication,
and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939,
949 (2011).
116 See Ryan Patrick Alford, The Star Chamber and the Regulation of the Legal Profession
1570–1640, 51 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 639, 705 (2011); F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: ALSO THE
FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 260 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1910).
117 On the tensions wrought by fusion of law and equity in New York, see, for instance,
CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR. & HENRY ADAMS, CHAPTERS OF ERIE, AND OTHER ESSAYS 1–99
(Boston, James R. Osgood & Company 1871).
118 See Donald L. McMurry, The Legal Ancestry of the Pullman Strike Injunctions, 14 INDUS.
& LABOR RELATIONS REV. 235, 236–38 (1961). See also Seth Davis, Implied Rights of Action,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 21 (2014) (noting the federal government’s property interest in the
U.S. mail as a ground for equitable intervention).
119 Cf. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
489, 515–16 (1954) (attempting to shore up the distinction between prohibitive and
affirmative injunctions).
OF
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of state enforcement officers, including criminal prosecutions.120
Fearful that federal equity would overprotect commercial interests, an
increasingly Progressive Congress responded with a procedural brake.
Injunctions against state officers enforcing state laws would have to go
before a panel of three lower court judges with a mandatory right of
appeal to the Supreme Court.121
School desegregation cases in a later era reflected both sides of
the Young settlement. Federal equity could reach down to the lowest
officers of local school boards and demand action, yet three-judge
panels operating at “all deliberate speed”122 and interlocutory appeals
slowed the pace of reform.123 Nevertheless, desegregation cases fired
the imaginations of a generation of jurists on what federal equity might
be, just as the labor controversies had instructed an earlier generation
on the perils of equity. In 1930, Felix Frankfurter published The Labor
Injunction to advise Congress on how to avoid “[g]overnment by
injunction,” that is, government by federal injunction of state
officers.124 Fifty years later, Owen Fiss published The Civil Rights
Injunction as something of a field guide for suing state officers in
federal equity.125
C. Reconstruction’s Revival
As the Civil Rights Movement expanded its focus from schools to
police departments, the Supreme Court developed competing historical visions to describe the competing imperatives from Congress: one
encouraging equitable intervention and the other equitable restraint.
Both were on full display in Monroe v. Pape, a case with claims that
sounded in common law but that presaged broader application in a
federal system which had at last followed the states into fusion.126
The Monroe litigation was part of a systematic effort by the
American Civil Liberties Union to make § 1983 an effective vehicle for
120 The story of Young has been told from many angles, each drawing a different lesson.
For an overview, see David L. Shapiro, Ex Parte Young and the Uses of History, 67 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 69 (2011).
121 Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, and the Fate of the Three-Judge District
Court, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 101, 103 (2008).
122 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
123 See generally PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW’S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA (1990); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL
STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–1950 (1987).
124 FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 1 (1930). At
Frankfurter’s urging, Congress significantly restricted federal courts’ power to issue labor
injunctions in the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932. See Mathew W. Finkin, The Meaning and
Contemporary Vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 93 NEB. L. REV. 6 (2014).
125 OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978).
126 365 U.S. 167, 169–72 (1961).
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challenging police abuses in federal court.127 Despite the possibility of
injunctive relief under Ex parte Young,128 the Monroe team was
convinced that even small damages actions, gradually accumulating
against the budgets of police departments, would spur more
meaningful reform.129 The difficulty was that without modern class
action procedures, each case presented just one instance of abuse,
usually concerning conduct that was already proscribed and at least
theoretically punishable in state courts.130 Did § 1983 permit federal
jurisdiction over such local, apparently one-off claims in lieu of state
proceedings? To make the affirmative case, the Monroe team scoured
the legislative record of the Forty-Second Congress and submitted
hundreds of pages arguing that Monroe was exactly the kind of case
§ 1983’s proponents expected (and its opponents feared) would come
before the federal bar.131
In one of the great ironies of the Court’s history, the close reading
and skillful archival work of the Monroe team garnered the unfading
admiration of the rustic William O. Douglas while provoking the ire of
the Court’s resident academic Felix Frankfurter. While there were
precedents enough to support Monroe’s reading of “under color of”
state law,132 Douglas opened the opinion and rested his holding on the
force of legislative history. Thrice he reminded readers that § 1983 was
once known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, premised on distrust that state
courts would enforce facially legitimate state laws equally.133 The
opinion cited congressmen’s statements from the Congressional Globe
over thirty times to conclude, “[t]he federal remedy is supplementary
to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused
127 See Philip O’Sullivan, Putting a Check on Police Violence: The Legal Services Market,
Section 1983, Torture, Abusive Detention Practices, and the Chicago Police Department from 1954
to 1967, 56 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 6).
128 Young and rulings like it had not been premised on § 1983. See Woolhandler, supra
note 103, at 100. Some have supposed the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
directly grounds a cause of action for injunctive relief against the unconstitutional acts of
state officers. See RICHARD H. FALLON JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID
L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 927
(7th ed. 2015).
129 Although numerous suits succeeded, the expected incentive effects did not
materialize. See O’Sullivan, supra note 127, at 42–45. See also Joanna C. Schwartz, Police
Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 952–60 (2014).
130 See Suzette M. Malveaux, The Modern Class Action Rule: Its Civil Rights Roots and
Relevance Today, 66 KAN. L. REV. 325, 330 (2017).
131 For further discussion of the contents of the briefing, see Sheldon Nahmod, Section
1983 Is Born: The Interlocking Supreme Court Stories of Tenney and Monroe, 17 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 1019, 1044–45 & n.144 (2013).
132 See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107–08 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299, 325 (1941).
133 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171, 172, 185 (1961).
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before the federal one is invoked.”134 Although Douglas’s loyalty to
any particular interpretive theory could be fleeting,135 he remained
strongly committed to the historical approach to § 1983 to the end of
his career.
Where Douglas was welcoming of Reconstruction’s history,
Frankfurter was dismissive. Tasking his law clerk to peruse 400 pages
of the Congressional Globe, Frankfurter announced that “under color
of” law was barely mentioned, and what little discussion existed was
consistent with Frankfurter’s conclusion that misconduct had to be the
official policy of a state before a federal action could lie.136 Relying on
recent Civil War historiography that viewed the War and its aftermath
as a tragic accident of overheated rhetoric, Frankfurter discounted the
statements of Radical Republicans on which Douglas relied.137
Instead, Frankfurter emphasized the moderate Republican James
Garfield’s view that “when we provide by congressional enactment to
punish a mere violation of a State law, we pass the line of constitutional
authority.”138 The selection of that quotation was telling, because
Garfield had not made the statement in reference to § 1983 but as a
general observation of how he read § 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-

134
135

Id. at 183.
See NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (2010); Melvin I. Urofsky, Conflict Among the Brethren: Felix
Frankfurter, William O. Douglas and the Clash of Personalities and Philosophies on the United States
Supreme Court, 1988 DUKE L.J. 71, 81 (1988).
136 Frankfurter described his methods and laid out his views in a fifty-three-page memo
circulated to the conference, much of which became the basis of his dissenting opinion in
Monroe. Memorandum for the Conference, Re: No. 39—Monroe v. Pape (Nov. 9, 1960)
(on file with author). The clerk in question was Professor Anthony Amsterdam, who
appears not to have taken his Justice’s history lessons to heart. See Amsterdam, supra note
102, at 856–57 (arguing that legislative history from Reconstruction supported federal
suspension of state court proceedings). The memo with a cover letter can be found in the
Papers of William O. Douglas, Library of Congress, Box 1246, No. 39.
137 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 225 & n.35 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing with approval
the “dispassionate appraisal” of J.G. RANDALL, THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 724–
30 (1937)). Randall’s account of The Blundering Generation, 27 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 3
(1940), was intended to revise the interpretation, announced by Lincoln’s Secretary of State
William Seward and propounded by Randall’s contemporary W.E.B. Du Bois, that the Civil
War had been a “irrepressible conflict” between a southern slave society and an increasingly
liberal democratic North. Randall’s volume became the standard text on Reconstruction
for decades, while Du Bois’s was ignored, not even noticed in the American Historical Review.
See Georg G. Iggers, The Historian as an Engaged Intellectual: Historical Writing and Social
Criticism—A Personal Retrospective, in THE ENGAGED HISTORIAN: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
INTERSECTIONS OF POLITICS, ACTIVISM AND THE HISTORICAL PROFESSION 277, 285–86
(Stefan Berger, ed., 2019).
138 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 231 n.47 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting remarks of Rep.
Garfield, CONG. GLOBE APP., 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 154 (1871)).
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ment.139 While Frankfurter doubted that Congress meant to confer
jurisdiction up to the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment, he did not
think Congress’s intent had to be determined, because the
Constitution itself could not reach Monroe’s case.140 Section 1983,
Frankfurter concluded, had to “accord[] with the presuppositions of
our federal system,” chief among them that “the state courts, not the
federal courts, would remain the primary guardians of that
fundamental security of person and property which the long evolution
of the common law had secured to one individual as against other
individuals. The Fourteenth Amendment did not alter this basic
aspect of our federalism.”141 The radical views of the drafters of an act
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment could thus be conveniently
ignored.
D. Federal Equity Follows State Law
Over time, the Justices continued to argue with one another about
Reconstruction’s history as they applied § 1983, sometimes with
Douglas’s views commanding a majority,142 sometimes Frankfurter’s.143
A decade after Monroe, the Court considered what to do with § 1983’s
grant of federal equity power. Given that federal courts had jurisdiction to award remedies whether or not state courts would hear the
federal claim, what happened if state courts were in the process of
hearing such claims? Could these proceedings be equitably enjoined
as they could under the removal statutes?144 In two cases decided in
consecutive terms, the Court gave two contrary answers.

139 Frankfurter noted that Garfield’s statements were directed at § 3 of the draft Ku
Klux Klan Act and not what became § 1983. Id. Frankfurter did not contend with the fact
that Garfield explicitly pressed for an amendment limiting federal court jurisdiction to
cases of “systematic maladministration” by state officials but was rebuffed by the bill’s
sponsor, Samuel Shellabarger. See CONG. GLOBE APP., 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 153–54 (1871).
140 See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 202 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 237.
142 E.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144 (1970).
143 E.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971).
144 Although civil rights removal was moribund after the Court’s decision in City of
Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966), legislation in 1875, now codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441, gives defendants (originally both parties) broad rights to remove almost any case
that could have been originally filed in federal court. Despite no textual reference to
equitable injunctions in aid of enforcing this jurisdiction, the consensus of authorities has
long maintained such decrees do not come under the bar of the Anti-Injunction Act. See
supra note 40.
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Younger v. Harris involved the criminal prosecution of several
California professors for teaching “the doctrines of Karl Marx.”145
Going only off the majority opinion by Justice Black, one could hardly
guess that Harris’s claim was brought under § 1983. The statute and
its history were nowhere mentioned in the opinion; the cause of action
was left unstated. Yet the opinion did not lack a historical recounting.
“Since the beginning of this country’s history, Congress has . . .
manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from
interference by federal courts,” Black’s opinion began.146 And the
beginning of the nation’s history remained Black’s theme. “The
Framers rejected” both “centralization” and “blind deference” to state
courts.147 They believed “that the National Government will fare best
if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate
functions in their separate ways.”148 This ideal Black famously
described as “Our Federalism” and rhapsodized, “It should never be
forgotten that this slogan, ‘Our Federalism,’ born in the early
struggling days of our Union of States, occupies a highly important
place in our Nation’s history and its future.”149
Initially, Black’s opinion said almost nothing at all about equity.
Our Federalism, paired with the Anti-Injunction Act, grounded the
holding. After ruling that the Anti-Injunction Act trumped § 1983,
Black’s first draft of Younger concluded that “the policy of state trials
of state crimes is too much a part of the warf and woof of our society,
too essential a part of our Federalism to be lightly sacrificed.”150 But
that holding apparently could not keep a majority. Black subsequently
abandoned his analysis of the Anti-Injunction Act (and with it all
mention of § 1983). Perhaps in response to Douglas’s stinging dissent,
Black dropped the “warf and woof” line and added the defense that
“[t]he concept” of Our Federalism did “not mean blind deference to

145 401 U.S. at 42.
146 Id. at 43.
147 Id. at 44.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 44–45. “Our Federalism” had no clear referent as a “slogan.” Indeed, Black’s
initial draft did not capitalize the phrase or set it off in quotation marks. Younger v. Harris
(C.D. Cal.) (draft opinion) (on file with author). The phrase crops up several times without
systematic elaboration in the decisions of Justice Frankfurter, including in his Monroe
dissent quoted above. Cf. John M. Harlan, The Bill of Rights and the Constitution: An Excerpt
from an Address, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1964) (“And it should further be observed
that our federalism not only tolerates, but encourages, differences between federal and
state protection of individual rights, so long as the differing policies alike are founded in
reason and do not run afoul of dictates of fundamental fairness.”).
150 Younger v. Harris, at [9] (C.D. Cal.) (draft opinion) (on file with author), available
in Papers of Hugo Lafayette Black, Library of Congress, Box 438 [hereinafter Papers of
Hugo Lafayette Black].
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‘States’ Rights’”—the only allusion to nineteenth-century history that
appeared anywhere in the final opinion.151
Now without a statute for his ground, Black switched to equity.
The revised draft suddenly identified the maxim that equity followed
the law as among “the primary sources of the policy” of Founding-era
federalism, but Black turned the maxim in new directions.152 Laying
out the traditional principle that “courts of equity should not act, and
particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the
moving party has an adequate remedy at law,” Black’s Younger opinion
treated the criminal prosecution itself as the adequate remedy that
extinguished equity’s jurisdiction.153 Up to this point, “adequate at
law” had been a term of art used to refer to money damages and the
common-law pleadings that secured them.154 Younger took the phrase
and vacated its law and equity distinction, replacing it with a state and
federal one. Now any state forum that would hear a federal claim—
whether or not it would actually provide relief—could preclude the
federal hearing. Equity no longer followed the law in the sense that
chancery came behind to cure the deficiencies of common-law
remedies, but rather in the sense that federal jurisdiction obtained
only after states had finished with the claim.155
Douglas’s lone dissent chided the majority for gushing over
eighteenth-century history while ignoring all that came after.156
151 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
152 Id. at 43.
153 See id. at 43–44; see also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82.
154 See supra notes 18, 55. See also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82; Atlas
Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 569 (1939) (“By long-settled construction, the
accepted test of legal adequacy . . . is the legal remedy which the federal, rather than state,
courts afford.”).
155 Once a state has finished with a claim, the usual path to federal court is certiorari
to the Supreme Court, not review in fact-finding federal trial courts under § 1983. Further,
the Court’s increasing discretion to order certiorari of state court decisions calls into
question whether “the judicial power of the United States [shall] be called into play at all.”
Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’
Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1728 (2000). Younger was neither the first nor the last time
the Court announced a broad rule of equitable “abstention” from exercising federal
jurisdiction. See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941); Colo.
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976) (although the
equitable nature of Colorado River abstention is open to some doubt). Younger abstention is,
however, significantly harsher than the other varieties. See Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 816 n.22
(noting that “[w]here a case is properly within this category of [Younger] cases, there is no
discretion to grant injunctive relief”). At least as crafted by its principal author, Justice
Frankfurter, Pullman abstention was to be at most a delay rather than a declination of federal
jurisdiction. See Martha A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman
Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1163–87 (1974).
156 Younger, 401 U.S. at 58 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justices Stewart and Harlan
concurred but wrote separately to make clear the Court was not reaching a decision on the
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“Whatever the balance of the pressures of localism and nationalism
prior to the Civil War, they were fundamentally altered by the war.”157
Because Douglas wrote his dissent right after receiving Black’s first
draft, he focused his arguments on the Anti-Injunction Act.158 Relying
on his Monroe opinion, Douglas argued that § 1983 was an “express”
exception to the 1793 Act.159 Given the legislative context and the
breadth of the jurisdiction conferred, there was “no more good reason
for allowing a general statute dealing with federalism passed at the end
of the 18th century to control another statute also dealing with
federalism, passed almost 80 years later, than to conclude that the early
concepts of federalism were not changed by the Civil War.”160 Douglas
did not revise his dissent after Black shifted his grounds to federal
equity. Thus, the majority’s dramatically altered reading of “adequate
at law” passed without further remark.
Douglas’s views prevailed the very next Term in Mitchum v. Foster,
a case challenging a municipal obscenity ordinance in Florida.161 In
the period between the retirement of Justice Black and the seating of
his successor, the Court revisited the question of how § 1983 was to
operate under the Anti-Injunction Act.162 Sidestepping the application
of Younger, the Court ruled that § 1983 was indeed an “express”
exception to the Act, although the expression became clear only in the
light of § 1983’s Reconstruction context. Guided by a remarkable 200page memo submitted by his clerk, Justice Potter Stewart issued a
unanimous ruling that carefully retraced the legislative history of
§ 1983.163

scope of the Anti-Injunction Act. Id. at 54–56. Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall
concurred only in the result. Id. at 56–58. For an explanation of Justice Brennan’s concurrence, see Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1120–22 (1977).
157 Younger, 401 U.S. at 61 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
158 Compare Douglas’s published dissent with that received by Black after the initial,
pre-equity draft of Younger circulated, Papers of Hugo Lafayette Black, supra note 150.
159 Younger, 401 U.S. at 62 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
160 Id.
161 407 U.S. 225 (1972). Apparently the Court had been sharply divided before Black’s
departure. Douglas circulated a draft dissent on April 16, 1971, before the Court came
around to his views. See Papers of William O. Douglas, supra note 136, Box 1520, No. 876.
162 Justice Harlan had also retired. The new Justices, Powell and Rehnquist, were not
seated in time to participate in Mitchum. See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 225.
163 The memo was written by James Bieke, now a partner at Sidley Austin LLP. It
proposed several steps the Court should take to conform its jurisprudence to the original
intent of § 1983’s framers. Memorandum from Justice Potter Stewart to the Conference
(Dec. 20, 1971) (on file with author), available in Papers of William J. Brennan, Library of
Congress, Box I:259, No. 70-27. Justice Stewart authored opinions following the memo’s
recommendations in Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972), and Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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Once again, citations to the Congressional Globe dominated the
Court’s opinion, including entries that had been missed in the Monroe
litigation such as the biblical prose of Congressman Aaron F. Perry:
Sheriffs, having eyes to see, see not; judges, having ears to hear,
hear not; witnesses conceal the truth or falsify it; grand and petit
juries act as if they might be accomplices. . . . [A]ll the apparatus
and machinery of civil government, all the processes of justice,
skulk away as if government and justice were crimes and feared
detection. Among the most dangerous things an injured party can
do is to appeal to justice. 164

Although much criticized for creating an implied express
exception,165 Mitchum’s holding offered a plausible reading of the
original statutes if one agreed with the Court that the removal statutes
incorporated by § 1983 were themselves express exceptions to the AntiInjunction Act.166
After the back-to-back decisions in Younger and Mitchum, the lower
federal courts were left in an unenviable dilemma. Were they
supposed to suspend state proceedings in § 1983 actions or not? Was
the eighteenth century to be their primary guide, or the nineteenth?
Understandably, few lower courts had followed the Supreme Court
into the century-old Congressional Globe in crafting their § 1983 rulings.
But Monroe and now Mitchum had treated the legislative history as
essential to the correct application of the statute. Finally in 1972, the
Seventh Circuit became the first lower court to issue a major opinion
grounded on the historical background of § 1983.
The case, Littleton v. Berbling,167 could hardly be surpassed as a
paradigm case for the Reconstruction statute. Nineteen plaintiffs, a
mix of white and black residents and activists, sued the principal judges
and police officers of Cairo, the southernmost town in Illinois and
reputed to be one of the major midwestern holdouts against the Civil
Rights Movement.168 The complaint alleged a variety of due process
and equal protection violations.169 Officers arbitrarily denied parade
permits or changed their conditions at the eleventh hour. Prosecutors
refused to charge a man who murderously drove a truck through a
164 Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 241 (quoting CONG. GLOBE APP., 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1871)
(remarks of Rep. Perry)).
165 See, e.g., David P. Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 317,
329 (1978); Martin H. Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. CHI. L. REV.
717, 733–39 (1977).
166 See supra note 163.
167 468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972).
168 For the story of the litigation from the perspective of Littleton’s trial court counsel,
see MARTHA A. MILLS, LAWYER, ACTIVIST, JUDGE: FIGHTING FOR CIVIL AND VOTING RIGHTS
IN MISSISSIPPI AND ILLINOIS 303–24 (2015).
169 Complaint, Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972), (No. 70–103).
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protest. Magistrates set discriminatory bail amounts based on the race
of the defendant. Violent intimidation of protestors and voters went
unchecked by the local and state authorities. Taking the operative
complaint as true, one would have to conclude that the scene
described by Congressman Perry during Reconstruction had gone
undisturbed in Cairo for a hundred years.
The Seventh Circuit saw it that way. Given “a distinct allegation
that plaintiffs are being subjected to unequal treatment by the judges
because of their race and their civil rights activity,” the court found
that Younger’s equity rules did not pose much of a problem.170 A fair
criminal hearing in such circumstances was unlikely in state court, and
a discriminatory sentence that was nevertheless within the guideline
range would be difficult to overturn. Therefore, the plaintiffs’
“remedy at law is plainly inadequate and equitable relief is proper.”171
The court thus accepted Younger’s federalist meaning of “adequate at
law” but used it to reach discriminatory state practices rather than to
shield them. That, after all, is what Mitchum seemed to counsel when
it declared that “legislative history makes evident that Congress clearly
conceived that it was altering the relationship between the States and
the Nation with respect to the protection of federally created rights.”172
Taking its own dive into the legislative history, the Seventh Circuit
bolstered its ruling with citations not just from the debates
surrounding § 1983 but the entire panoply of Enforcement Acts passed
to implement the directives of the Fourteenth Amendment against
state officers.173
The Supreme Court reversed.174 A five-Justice majority gave up
any attempt to square its federalism jurisprudence with the legislative
history of the statute it was applying. The Court was troubled by a
proposed remedy that “would contemplate interruption of state
proceedings to adjudicate assertions of noncompliance by” local
officers.175 Ignoring the historical record quoted by both the dissent
and the lower court showing that § 1983’s framers had contemplated
this scenario, the majority flatly declared that no “adequate basis for
equitable relief” had been shown.176
In a passage that has since become a canonical statement on
ripeness doctrine, the Court worried that the plaintiffs did not want to

170 Littleton, 468 F.2d at 408–09.
171 Id. at 412.
172 Id. at 401 (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)).
173 See id. at 396–405. On the Enforcement Acts that preceded § 1983, see HYMAN &
WIECEK, supra note 101, at 467–72, 488–97.
174 O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
175 Id. at 500.
176 Id. at 499–500.
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enjoin the state’s criminal statutes but to monitor the prosecution of
them. Although some of the plaintiffs alleged they had been subjected
to discriminatory prosecutions in the past, the majority believed it was
speculative to infer that discriminatory practices might continue
(notwithstanding a class certification covering presently detained and
prosecuted defendants).177 Any equitable relief struck the Court as
“nothing less than an ongoing federal audit of state criminal
proceedings which would indirectly accomplish the kind of
interference that Younger v. Harris . . . sought to prevent.”178
In one of his final opinions for the Court, Douglas dissented. “We
know from the record and oral argument that Cairo, Illinois, is boiling
with racial conflicts,” he observed.179 To be sure, the exact proofs
might not be forthcoming on all points, but the complaint at least
alleged “a more pervasive scheme for suppression of blacks and their
civil rights than I have ever seen.”180 The dissent acknowledged that it
might be awkward to craft a sufficient remedy, and an ongoing audit
was “a regime that we do not foster.”181 But in answer Douglas combined the old idea of the chain of the rope with the modern fusionist
ideal that remedies could depend not on pleadings but on trials. “It
will be much more appropriate to pass on the nature of any equitable
relief to be granted after the case has been tried,” Douglas argued.182
Let the court find the facts and see if the strands added up into a rope.
“A single instance of sentencing by itself might not strike the
conscience of a reviewing court, but when coupled with a pattern of
discriminatory treatment could well justify the equitable intervention
of a federal court.”183
Littleton marked a decisive shift in the history of equity’s
federalism. It signaled the triumph of Younger’s state-protecting
definition of “adequate at law” dressed up in the garb of eighteenthcentury rhetoric,184 and the demise of Mitchum’s quest to apply the
original intent of the Reconstruction Congress.185 In the years follow177 Class certification today provides one rather direct path around O’Shea v. Littleton’s
ripeness concerns, so long as certification is moved at the proper time. See Genesis
Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 78–79 (2013). On Littleton’s canonical status, see
FALLON ET AL., supra note 128, at 227–37.
178 O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 500.
179 Id. at 507 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
180 Id. at 509 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
181 Id. at 510 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
182 Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
183 Id. at 511 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
184 See Aviam Soifer & H.C. Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction,
55 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1141–44, 1204 n.255 (1977).
185 Reconstruction history appeared again from time to time in Supreme Court
opinions, but virtually never as the chief or sole support of the holding as it had in Monroe
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ing Littleton, the Court swiftly extended Younger abstention to state
proceedings filed subsequent to federal actions, a kind of “reverse
removal” that allowed state prosecutors to yank cases from federal
court into their exclusive jurisdiction.186 Lower courts have extended
Younger further. The Second Circuit, for instance, does not permit
federal jurisdiction in equity to review any part of a state’s criminal
justice system, including systemwide regulatory policies of detention
and mesne process.187 Surely this marks one of the odder applications
of the Ku Klux Klan Act.
CONCLUSION
A peculiar divergence has opened in recent years between the
horizontal and vertical applications of federal equity. In an increasingly fused system of law and equity, horizontal injunctions against the
coordinate branches of the federal government have become
remarkably easy for the federal courts to order. Inspired by Younger
and its progeny, the Supreme Court has for a while maintained that
“federalism concerns” counsel more hesitancy in awarding equitable
relief against state as opposed to federal agencies.188 But even against
the latter, the dam appears to have burst in 2016’s United States v. Texas.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed a nationwide injunction against the Obama
Administration’s Deferred Action for Parents of Americans program,
and a divided Supreme Court affirmed the judgment without
opinion.189 What was the grave injury entitling Texas to such dramatic
relief? The state pleaded a variety of options, but the one the Fifth
Circuit proceeded on was the claim that Texas sustained a small
financial loss on each driver’s license it issued to undocumented
immigrants.190
Since 2016, these relatively minor financial injuries have sustained
several requests for nationwide injunctions.191 Most recently, in August

and Mitchum. See, e.g., Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 540 (1984) (finding no common law
judicial immunity from prospective relief); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 707 n.41
(1979) (inferring a private right of action from Title IX’s prohibition of sex discrimination).
But see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 665–69 (1978) (examining the legislative
history of § 1983 at length to find municipalities are “persons” under the statute).
186 Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 352 (1975); Fiss, supra note 156, at 1134–36.
187 Wallace v. Kern, 520 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1975).
188 Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 98 (1995).
189 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016), aff’g without op. by an equally divided
court 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015).
190 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d at 149–53.
191 See, e.g., E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, F. Supp. 3d 922, 957, 960 (N.D. Ca.
2019) (granting preliminary injunction); U. S. House of Representatives v. Price, No. 165202, 2017 WL 3271445 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 1, 2017) (granting motion of 17 states to intervene);
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2021, a district court in Texas issued yet another nationwide injunction
against the Biden Administration’s arrest and deportation priorities
for certain classes of immigrants.192 This time, Texas’s injury was the
cost of detaining an alien that could have been subject to federal
detention and deportation. Although the arrest of any given alien
could hardly be more speculative than the arrest of the Littleton
plaintiffs, the court decided that “[i]f even one alien not detained due
to the [Administration’s] Memoranda recidivates, Texas’s costs ‘will
increase’ in accordance with its current cost per inmate.”193 The court
did not even entertain the question of whether any other available
remedy might adequately address a purely fiscal injury.
In addition to restraining the Executive from departing from the
prior Administration’s enforcement priories, the district court ordered
monthly reports from the government listing every alien known to the
government eligible for detention under the relevant statutes, a list of
reasons why the alien was not immediately detained, and the identity
of the government official making the decision not to arrest.194 While
the merits appeal remains pending, so far the en banc Fifth Circuit has
gone out of its way to sustain what O’Shea once called an “ongoing
federal audit.”195
If these trends continue, the merger of law and equity at the
horizontal, federal level will go further than any reformer at the turn
of the twentieth century could have expected, as virtually any financial
injury supports an entitlement to an injunction against the Executive.
Professor Laycock has long argued the “death of the irreparable injury
rule” as a matter of practice, but here at last we see the purest obliteration of the principle that equity follows the law.196 Despite purely
monetary injuries, state petitioners against the federal government
Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) (granting
temporary restraining order).
192 Texas v. United States, No. 21-cv-00016, slip op. at 157 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2021).
193 Id. at 27.
194 Id. at 158–59. Curiously, the court later characterized its reporting order as one of
case management rather than equitable relief. See id. at Docket Entry No. 92 (Aug. 23,
2021). But so far as this author is aware, orders regulating mesne process under equitable
jurisdiction are indistinguishable from orders of provisional relief.
195 O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 510 (1974). See Texas v. United States, Order
Lifting Stay, No. 21–40618 (5th Cir. Nov. 30, 2021) (en banc). The Fifth Circuit has recently
sustained two other regional or nationwide injunctions against the Administration over
motions to stay. BST Holdings v. OSHA, 17 F.4th 604 (5th Cir. 2021); Louisiana v. Becerra,
20 F.4th 260 (5th Cir. 2021).
196 LAYCOCK, supra note 66. See also AZIZ Z. HUQ, THE COLLAPSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
REMEDIES 3–4 (2021) (noting that challengers “that bridle against [federal] government
regulation tend to have an easy glide path into federal court . . . [b]ut when an individual
challenges illegal violence physically inflicted by a particular government agent as a
violation of constitutional rights, the Court takes a less hospitable view”).
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have received injunctions protecting not only their treasuries, but also
those of every other non-complaining state. More than that, state
policy has determined the entitlement to equitable relief, because one
state’s choice to issue licenses at a loss or to jail immigrants subject to
federal jurisdiction has created the very injury it petitions federal
equity to redress. Where the antebellum statutes sought to protect
federal equity from the policy experiments of the states, federal equity
now follows state policy.
Meanwhile along the vertical, state and federal dimension, federal
equity has been largely reduced to a doctrine of federalism that bars
relief except in the most extreme cases of unconstitutional violations—
and even then, relief can be uncertain and oft delayed.197 The same
Fifth Circuit that sustains national injunctions against immigration
policy consistently stays or overturns district court orders that reach
the merits of civil rights claims against state officers.198 In January 2022,
the en banc Fifth Circuit invited a district court to extend Younger
abstention to pretrial bail proceedings found to be in violation of the
Constitution by every other court that has evaluated similar bail
regimes on the merits.199 Along the vertical dimension, then, equity’s
rope now functions more like a chain. No matter the factfinding of
the court below, no matter the careful braiding of narratives entitling
civil rights plaintiffs to relief, the bare presence of injunctive relief

197 A robust federal equity power against state regulatory or quasi-criminal proceedings
appears to persist in at least the domain of First Amendment rights of free exercise and
assembly. See, e.g., Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1298 (2021); S. Bay United
Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716, 717 (2021); Roman Catholic Diocese of
Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020); Okla. State Conf. of the NAACP v. O’Connor,
No. CIV-21-859-C, 2021 WL 4992754, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 27, 2021); Dream Defs. v.
DeSantis, No. 21cv191, 2021 WL 4099437, at *32 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2021); Dakota Rural
Action v. Noem, 416 F. Supp. 3d 874, 893 (D. S.D. 2019). In this domain the Court’s
substantive law of impermissible burdens and overbreadth has been able to overcome its
procedural concerns with speculative harm and invasive remedies expressed in cases like
Littleton. This development was hardly foreordained, as Younger, Mitchum, and Littleton
themselves were squarely raising First Amendment claims.
198 See, e.g., United States v. Texas, No. 21-50949, 2021 WL 4786458 (5th Cir. Oct. 14,
2021) (motions panel); Valentine v. Collier, 956 F.3d 797 (5th Cir. 2020) (motions panel);
ODonnell v. Salgado, 913 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2019) (motions panel).
199 See Daves v. Dall. Cnty., 22 F.4th 522, 548 (5th Cir. 2022). The cases concern
allegations of illegal detention and arbitrary process in the setting of criminal bail. The
practices have been ruled constitutionally deficient by numerous federal courts. See Schultz
v. State, 330 F. Supp. 3d 1344 (N.D. Ala. 2018); Caliste v. Cantrell, 329 F. Supp. 3d 296 (E.D.
La. 2018); ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (S.D. Tex. 2017); Buffin v. City &
Cty. of S.F., No. 15-cv-04959, 2018 WL 424362 (N.D. Cal. 2018); as well as many state courts,
for example, see In re Humphrey, 482 P.3d 1008, (Cal. 2021); Valdez-Jimenez v. Eighth Jud.
Dist. Ct., 460 P.3d 976 (Nev. 2020); State v. Pratt, 166 A.3d 600 (Vt. 2017); State v. Brown,
338 P.3d 1276 (N.M. 2014).
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against state officers triggers suspicion on review and, quite often, a
stay or reversal of the order.200
The asymmetry between vertical and horizontal federal equity has
been cast into especially stark relief during the COVID-19 pandemic.
While jails and prisons have become epicenters of disease transmission
and many states have suspended trials (but not arrests), leading to ever
more brutal and overcrowded conditions, federal courts have found
themselves largely powerless to order meaningful relief against state
and local practices.201 Yet surprisingly, “[l]itigation involving ICE
detention was the exception.”202 Immigration statutes are hardly
accommodating of federal court interference with federal detention,203 but in extremis, federal equity has found its way through against
the coordinate federal branches.204 That the exact same conditions
confront state jail detainees possessed of the same constitutional rights
has, however, failed to move the federal chancellors.
Nevertheless, equity’s federalism still has its surprising turns.
District courts continue to find their way through the thickets of
Younger and Littleton to award meaningful relief, often with explicit
reference to the Reconstruction statutes whose purpose they seek to
fulfill.205 Sometimes appellate courts sustain them.206 But over time
the federal courts and especially the Supreme Court have changed
their attitude toward equity’s federalism, changed their orientation to
what, as Hart and Wechsler once phrased it, federal “courts are good
for.”207 At one time, Congress and the courts agreed that federal equity
had to be protected from the manipulation of state practices and
fusionist reforms. The Reconstruction Congress empowered the
200 Professor Fallon suggests that the function of justiciability doctrines to cut off the
factfinding powers of district court has made these doctrines primary tools of appellate
courts resistant to the substantive merits of a claim. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage
Between Justiciability and Remedies—And Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV.
633, 635–39 (2006); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law
Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1984).
201 See Brandon L. Garrett & Lee Kovarsky, Viral Injustice, 110 CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022), (manuscript at 4) available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=3790859 [https://perma.cc/59BJ-6XB9].
202 Id. (manuscript at 35).
203 See Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204 (U.S. 2018).
204 Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 201, (manuscript at 35–38).
205 See Fred O. Smith, Jr., Abstention in the Time of Ferguson, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2283,
2335–37, 2351–53 (2018).
206 E.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
207 Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 691 (1989) (quoting HENRY
MELVIN HART & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM xii
(1953)) (reviewing PAUL M. BATOR, DANIEL J. MELTZER, PAUL J. MISHKIN & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (3d ed.
1988)).
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courts to apply a broad menu of remedies to the unconstitutional
practices of the states, and at the height of the Civil Rights Movement,
the Supreme Court made this legislative history the centerpiece of its
federalism jurisprudence. The statutes remain on the books, the
legislative history in the archives. But what was once said of the state
courts could now be said of the federal: courts “having eyes to see, see
not; judges, having ears to hear, hear not.”208

208 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 241 (1972) (quoting CONG. GLOBE APP., 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Perry)).

